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THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE:
THE EFFECT OF MOTIVE ON FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Tax avoidance "by means which the law permits" traditionally has
been viewed as a legal right.' For forty-five years, however, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) has probed tax-
payers' business motives, often with the blessing of courts.' This has
led to the development of the business purpose doctrine, which per-
mits the Commissioner to ignore tax benefits for certain transactions
motivated by tax avoidance or non-business purposes. 3 Although the
doctrine arose in the context of reorganizations,4 it was extended
rapidly to other areas.- Recently, it has been discussed as a "perva-
1. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); accord, Chisholm v. Com-
missioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935).
2. Recent cases considering a business purpose requirement include: TSN Li-
quidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980); Foglesong v. Com-
missioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980); Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Stice v. United States, 540 F.2d 1077
(5th Cir. 1976); Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal
Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 615 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Dwyer v.
United States, 439 F. Supp. 99 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1980); Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 907 (1979); Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Roths-
child v. United States, 407 F.2d 404 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Schenk v. Commissioner, 41
T.C.M. (CCH) 455 (1980); Serbousek v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 479
(1977); Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 576 (1976). See generally Gunn, Tax Avoid-
ance, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 733 (1978); Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoid-
ance, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1953); Summers, A Critique of the Business-Purpose
Doctrine, 41 Or. L. Rev. 38 (1961).
3. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935); Bittker, Pervasive Judi-
cial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 Howard L.J.
693, 714-17 (1978); Summers, supra note 2, at 4041. Business purpose is usually
considered the exclusive alternate motive to tax avoidance. Rice, supra note 2, at
1044. But see Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1965) (required
business purpose for reorganization despite absence of tax avoidance motive).
Although the motive test may be required by statute rather than developed by
courts, see I.R.C. §§ 269, 302(c), 306(b)(4), 532, this Note primarily addresses situa-
tions in which no statutory basis exists.
4. Bittker, supra note 3, at 715. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the
case to which the business purpose doctrine is usually attributed, involved a reorga-
nization motivated by tax avoidance. Id. at 467.
5. Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950) (extended the doctrine to all statutes that
describe commercial transactions).
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sive judicial doctrine" in tax law.6 When and how the doctrine
should be applied, however, is still the subject of controversy.-
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides the Commissioner
with broad discretionary powers to determine taxable income.
These powers may be insufficient, however, to deal with tax conse-
quences that result from the literal application of tax statutes, but
thwart legislative intent. In such instances, a court may apply judicial
doctrines, such as the business purpose doctrine, to implement a per-
ceived legislative intent.'
This Note examines the justification of the business purpose doc-
trine as a judicial doctrine. It compares and contrasts the business
purpose doctrine with the related substance over form doctrine 10 and
argues that lower courts have misapplied the business purpose doc-
trine by failing to give proper consideration to legislative intent." It
concludes that the doctrine should be applied only in limited cir-
cumstances.
1. BUSINESS PURPOSE AND SUBSTANCE OVER FoR'%t
A. Substance Over Form
A doctrine often associated with the business purpose doctrine is
the substance over form doctrine. '2  This doctrine is often applied to
6. Bittker, supra note 3, at 693, 714-17.
7. Rice, supra note 2, at 1046. See generally Summers, supra note 2. Even in
reorganizations, courts are not certain how to apply the business purpose doctrine.
Compare Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 922 (1972) with Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 21 (2d
Cir. 1962). The court in Parshelsky found a sufficient business purpose for a reorgan-
ization in the shareholder's desire to bequeath different parts of his business to diffe-
rent legatees. Id. at 21. The court in Rafferty found insufficient as a business pur-
pose the shareholder's desire to bequeath different parts of his business to his sons
and daughters, 452 F.2d at 770-71, and, criticizing Parshelsky, held that an invest-
ment purpose of a shareholder is not, by itself, sufficient to satisfy the business
purpose test. Id. at 770.
8. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 269, 446(b), 482; see Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446,
467 (1959).
9. See, e.g., Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 739, 744 (1947); Helvering
v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 542 (1941); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467,
469-70 (1935).
10. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 722; Rice, supra note 2, at 1041-46.
11. One commentator refers to the business purpose doctrine as a "doctrine of
last resort, invoked only where no more concrete and measurable principle is avail-
able to lend respectability to the decision of the court." Rice. supra note 2. at 1044.
Another commentator suggested in 1961 that the influence of the doctrine was de-
clining. Summers, supra note 2, at 38. The vast majority of the cases discussed in
this Note, however, have been decided since 1961. See cases cited note 2 supra.
12. This Note defines substance over form broadly to include arguably discrete
doctrines such as the sham doctrine, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361,
366 (1960); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333-34 (1945);
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transactions motivated by tax avoidance, 3 may be aimed at tax
abuse, 14 and affects tax consequences in ways similar to the business
purpose doctrine. 5 Although courts intermingle and confuse the
doctrines," they are analytically discrete," and analysis of the distinc-
tions is necessary for proper application.
When a court perceives that the substance of an event lies within
the intended reach of a statute, but that the form of transaction takes
the event outside that reach, the court may ignore the form and ap-
ply the law to the substance of the event." This doctrine is variously
applied to torts, contracts,2" wills, 21 antitrust, z2 and other areas of
law.' It justifies piercing the corporate veil,24 ignoring the ostensible
creation of a trust,25 disregarding meaningless intermediate steps in a
Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1939); Goodstein v. Commissioner,
267 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir. 1959); see Bittker, supra note 3, at 703-13; Rice, supra
note 2, at 1027-28; Comment, Tax Avoidance Use of the Interest Deduction, 45 Tex.
L. Rev. 1218, 1228 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Interest Deduction], and the step
transactions doctrine. E.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 655-
57 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395 (1961)); Commissioner v.
Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661
(1939); American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), affd,
177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); see Bittker, supra
note 3, at 717-723; Comment, Step Transactions, 24 U. Miami L. Rev. 60, 66 (1969).
See generally Gutkin, Step Transactions, 9 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 1219 (1950);
Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. Inst.
Fed. Tax. 247 (1954). The substance over form doctrine is applied when the court
determines that the legal formalities of a transaction do not reflect the actual events
or lack economic substance. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-66
(1960).
13. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333 (1945).
14. See generally Bittker, supra note 3, at 703-13.
15. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), is cited as both a "business pur-
pose" and a "substance over form" case. See W. Andrews, Federal Income Taxation
of Corporate Transactions 114-16 (2d ed. 1979).
16. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 722. See generally Rice, 
supra note 2, at 1041-
17. The business purpose doctrine is derived from an interpretation of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). It is unique to
tax law. By contrast, the substance over form doctrine is found in other areas of law.
18. See note 12 supra.
19. See H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations § 146 (2d ed. 1970)
(piercing the corporate veil to create shareholder liability for corporate activity).
20. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, §§ 2-1, 2-2 (2d ed. 1977)
(lack of intent to create contract may control despite fornal contractual agreement).
21. See T. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law on Wills § 42 (2d ed. 1953) (tes-
tamentary nature of living trusts).
22. See L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 114, at 328 (1977) (re-
lated corporations treated as independent firms).
23. R. Paul, Restatement of the Law of Tax Avoidance, in Studies in Federal
Taxation 66-73 (1937).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See note 21 supra.
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series of integrated transactions,=" consolidating substantive steps in
such a series,' or voiding a contract.- In tax law, it has been used to
justify voiding reorganizations,' negating the assignment of income,
recharacterizing the sale or transfer of property between related
parties,3 recharacterizing sale and leaseback arrangements,-, disallow-
ing the deduction of interest,n and disregarding the separate corpo-
rate entity.?
There are various bases for applying the doctrine in tax cases.
Generally, congressional intent in enacting the specific section of the
Code is considered.' The principle is so pervasive, however, that
even if legislative history and other traditional sources of statutory
interpretation do not contain discussion of substance over form, a
preference for substance may be presumed.? For example, the Su-
preme Court, without specific statutory support, has presumed that
Congress intended a tax deductible loss to be a substantive economic
loss,7 an interest deduction to be derived from a transaction having
economic substance, 3 a sale and leaseback to be distinct from a
financing agreement,' control of income to constitute receipt,4 and,
in general, economic and factual reality to control tax
consequences. 4' This presumption often receives the implicit or ex-
press approval of Congress.' It is rebutted only when Congress im-
poses strict formal rules that favor form over substance.3
26. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1969).
27. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74, 80 (1950), affd
per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
28. See note 20 supra.
29. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
30. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114-20 (1940) (Court determined that in-
come rather than income producing property had been assigned).
31. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333-,34 (1945).
32. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 581-84 (1978).
33. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960).
34. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943).
35. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1935).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Pub. Ser. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950);
Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939). The Cumberland opinion merely con-
tains the relevant statute in a footnote, 338 U.S. at 452 n.1, and the Court in
Griffiths finds congressional intent with no explicit statutory support. 308 U.S. at
358.
37. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940).
38. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1960).
39. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573-74 (1978); Helvering v.
F.& R. Lazarus & Co. 308 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1939).
40. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
41. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582 (1978).
42. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 [hereinafter cited as 1954
Senate Report], reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4621, 5006
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The substance of a transaction is determined by inquiring into
facts, not motive.' Motive analysis, however, is often used as an aid
in interpreting equivocal facts,4 and a tax avoidance motive will often
be found before a transaction is characterized as without substance."°
This frequent correlation of tax avoidance motive and lack of sub-
stance is not, however, evidence of a common identity. For example,
assume that one's purpose for incorporating is to benefit from the
corporate tax rate structure, a tax avoidance motive. Despite this mo-
tive, if the corporation has economic vitality, corporate tax rules ap-
ply, and the substance over form rule is satisfied. 47  Conversely,
assume one incorporates to limit legal liability and, incidentally, ac-
quires the benefits of the lower corporate tax. If the corporation has
no real substance, the substance over form rule permits the Commis-
sioner to disregard the corporate form and tax corporate income
directly to the corporation's shareholders, despite the absence of a tax
avoidance motive." Although no Code section codifies a substance
over form rule,49 mere formalism aimed at thwarting the intended
effect of a Code section may.be ignored.' Because the concept per-
(implicitly approving decisions in Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), Helver-
ing v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), and Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)); 1954
Senate Report, supra, at 48, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
4679 (adopting objective tests based on the rule of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v.
Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951) into I.R.C.
§ 3340)(2)).
43. See Posey v. United States, 449 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (strict applica-
tion of I.R.C. § 333).
44. See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 454-56
(1950); Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 93, 99 n.21 (5th Cir. 1966);
Maysteel Prods. Inc. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1961).
45. R. Paul, supra note 23, at 152.
46. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945);
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
47. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1980); see National
Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
48. Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1945); see National
Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1949); Moline Properties,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 2.10 (4th ed. 1979); D. Kahn &
P. Gann, Corporate Taxation and Taxation of Partnerships and Partners 89-110
(1979).
49. Numerous statutes, however, enunciate a tax avoidance test. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 269 (acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax); id. § 302(c)(2)
(distributions in redemption of stock); id. § 306(b)(4) (dispositions of certain stock).
50. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 367 (1960); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
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vades the statutory scheme of the Code, applying this doctrine with-
out reference to specific legislative history is always justifiable.31
B. The Business Purpose Doctrine
The common law basis for the substance over form rule contrasts
sharply with the basis of the business purpose doctrine. Unlike the
substance over form doctrine, the business purpose doctrine is not
generally pervasive, nor is it pervasive in tax law. The Supreme
Court case generally cited as the origin of the business purpose doc-
trine is Gregory v. Helvering.52  The Court in Gregory, however,
dealt only with reorganizations and found support for a business pur-
pose test in the language and history of Code section 112(g).1 The
Supreme Court has never recognized, except by inference, that the
business purpose test might merit application in situations other than
reorganizations.' In fact, in United States v. Cumberland Public
Service Co., " the Court expressly refused to require a business pur-
pose when a corporation that had received an offer to purchase assets
liquidated and distributed those assets to shareholders, who sold the
distributed assets.6 The Court maintained that a finding of a major
tax avoidance motive was not a sufficient basis for attributing to the
corporation the sale by the shareholders. r - It held that tax conse-
quences flow from tax provisions.'
The business purpose doctrine represents an attempt by the courts
to implement a perceived legislative intent., No basis exists for find-
ing an intent by Congress to require a business purpose for all trans-
actions having tax consequences. 6w Therefore, justification for a busi-
51. In Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), the Court implied that
unless the plain meaning of the statute requires the Court to emphasize form, it will
apply the substance over form doctrine. Id. at 367.
52. 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 48, 16.21; D.
Kahn & P. Gann, supra note 48, at 710.
53. 293 U.S. at 467-69.
54. Numerous substance over form cases discuss motive. See notes 4446 suipra.
Nonetheless, the Court has been consistent in its use of motive as merely evidence
of the substance of a transaction. See notes 44, 46 supra and accompanying text.
55. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
56. Id. at 454-56.
57. Id. at 455.
58. Id. at 455-56.
59. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
60. See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 454-56
(1950); Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 873 (7th Cir. 1980); Quinlivan v.
Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Mann
v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 1973); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 499 F. Supp. 615, 621-22 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Dwyer v. United States,
439 F. Supp. 99, 102 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1980); May v. Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) No. 2 (1981); Bush Bros. v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 424, 437-39 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-1158 (6th Cir.
Feb. 29, 1980).
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ness purpose doctrine must be derived from the Code section to be
applied. 1 A doctrine that is derived from a code section should be
supported by reference to legislative history, predecessor statutes,
prior interpretation of the statute, or related statutes on the same
matter.6 Moreover, the business purpose test must be viewed in
light of the congressional preference for certainty of tax
consequences63 and the acknowledged uncertainty of applying a tax
avoidance motive test.'
II. APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE
Although lacking Supreme Court precedent as a judicial doctrine
applicable to areas other than reorganizations, the business purpose
doctrine has flourished in recent years." The Second Circuit first
extended the doctrine to corporate distributions and, in dicta, to all
"tax statute[s] [that] describe commercial ... transactions.", More
recently, the Commissioner has argued that business purpose is
necessary or motive determinative in transactions involving the dis-
tribution of corporate dividends, 7 interest deductions,3 the prepay-
61. See Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal
Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950); Basic
Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 749 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 576, 582-85 (1976).
62. The general rule for interpreting a code is that one may resort to legislative
history, predecessor statutes, prior interpretations, or other statutes on the same
matter. IA C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 28.10 (4th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Sutherland].
63. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 39 [hereinafter cited as 1954
House Report], reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4021, 4058, 4064;
1954 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 41-42, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 4672.
64. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 41-42, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 4672; 1954 House Report, supra note 63, at 32, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News at 4057.
65. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
66. Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950). For an in-depth review of "business
purpose" cases prior to 1960, see Rice, supra note 2, at 1041 n.66. See generally
Summers, supra note 2, at 30. In this context, business purpose may mean any
non-tax avoidance motive. See Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404, 408-13 (Ct.
Cl. 1969).
67. Commissioner v, Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950); TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United
States, 77-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9741, at 88,523-27 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 624
F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980); Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 749 (Ct. Cl.
1977); Bush Bros. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 424, 437 (1979), appeal docketed, No.
80-1158 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 1980); see I.R.C. § 316. The application of the doctrine to
the facts of Transport Trading has often been criticized. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's
Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 Yale L.J. 440, 452 (1968).
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ment of feed,6 9 gifts and leaseback, 70 the forgiveness of debt,7 ' the
assignment of income, 2 and installment sales." An examination of
the various fact patterns and the relevant sections to which the busi-
ness purpose test has been applied, however, demonstrates its incor-
rect application as a pervasive judicial doctrine without appropriate
concern for legislative intent.
A. Corporate Distributions
A business purpose has been required when shareholders of a
closely held corporation receive distributions prior to selling their
corporate stock. 74 Such a distribution from subsidiary to parent was
treated by the Court of Claims as part of the purchase price paid by a
third party purchaser of the shareholder's stock in Basic Inc. v.
United States." Citing the subsidiary's lack of business purpose for
the distribution, the court held that the distribution was not within
the meaning of dividend in Code section 316(a)(1).1
The requirement of a business purpose for corporate distributions
lacks support. This reasoning has been criticized by commentators,-
68. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1005 (1967); see I.R.C. § 163. Goldstein does not require an actual business
purpose, but does set a "purposive activity" standard. 364 F.2d at 741. This is a
variation of the business purpose test. See Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404,
408 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
69. Stice v. United States, 540 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1976); Clement v.
United States, 580 F.2d 422, 427-28 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907
(1979); Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144 (1975), superseded and expanded, Rev.
Rul. 79-229, 1979-2 C.B. 210 (1979); see I.R.C. §§ 162, 446(b). Section 162 expenses
must of course be business expenses. I.R.C. § 162(a). In the rulings, however, busi-
ness purpose is required for the timing of an admittedly legitimate business feed
purchase.
70. Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1975) (deductibility of
lease payments; business purpose requirement for gift as well as for rental payment),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Serbousek v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
479, 482 (1977) (same); see I.R.C. § 162.
71. Dwyer v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 99, 102 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 622 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1980); see I.R.C. § 61.
72. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309, 1313 (1976), reo'd and
remanded, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980); see Dwyer v. United States, 439 F. Supp.
99, 102 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1980); I.R.C.
§ 61.
73. Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 576, 584-85 (1976); see Bunker v. Commis-
sioner 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 736, 739 (1979); I.R.C. § 453.
74. See note 67 supra.
75. 549 F.2d 740, 743, 749 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
76. Id. at 749; see I.R.C. § 316(a)(1).
77. D. Kahn & P. Gann, supra note 48, at 121. One commentator attempted to
explain Basic as a step transaction case. Ditkoff, Intercorporate Dividends and Legiti-
mate Tax Avoidance, 4 J. Corp. Tax. 5, 14 (1977). For an example of a step transac-
tion in this area, see Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1194-96
(5th Cir. 1970) (distribution treated as a step in a sale; distinguished in TSN Liq-
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rejected by the Fifth Circuit,7' and is inconsistent with a recent Tax
Court decision. 71 The Court of Claims cited only substance over
form cases. Furthermore, there is no direct statutory support for
uidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328, 1333-35 (5th Cir. 1980), as applying
a substance over form rule), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
78. TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328, 1336 (5th Cir.
1980). It is not clear whetherthe court in TSN rejects the application of the business
purpose doctrine to corporate distributions, or merely rejects the test as applied in
Basic. TSN also involved a pre-sale distribution of a dividend in kind from a subsidi-
ary to a parent. The distribution was at the buyer's insistence. Id. at 1329-30. The
tax consequences were an 85% tax-free receipt of dividend income, as in Basic, and a
lower capital gain on sale of the subsidiary. Id. Although this split could be analyzed
in terms of a shareholder business purpose requirement versus a corporate business
requirement for the distribution, see note 7 supra (similar split in reorganization),
TSN emphasized the substance over form nature of the question, 624 F.2d at 1331-
32, and pointedly distinguished its facts from those of a substance over form case,
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied,
401 U.S. 939 (1951). 624 F.2d at 1333-34. Basic and TSN are also somewhat distin-
guishable because, in Basic, the taxpayer declined an alternate transaction for tax
reasons, 549 F.2d at 745; in TSN the taxpayer had no alternative transaction avail-
able. 624 F.2d at 1330. Tax consequences, however, were merely a factor that Basic
Inc. considered in rejecting a sale of assets and selecting a distribution in kind and
sale of stock. 549 F.2d at 745-46. Arguably, the business purpose doctrine does not
apply to taxpayers choosing between transactions producing identical results. Bittker,
supra note 3, at 711-13; Rice, supra note 2, at 1040-41. A taxpayer is not legally
required to maximize tax. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.
1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting). Whatever the doctrine's validity, it should never
apply when a taxpayer selects between alternate transactions, such as sale of stock
and sale of assets, that have different practical consequences. See B. Fox & E. Fox,
Business Organizations, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers § 27.01 (1981).
79. See Bush Bros. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 424 (1979), appeal docketed, No.
80-1158 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 1980). In Bush Bros., a plurality of the Tax Court held
that the non-recognition rule of I.R.C. § 311(a) applied to dividends in kind, did not
apply to a distribution motivated by tax avoidance. 73 T.C. at 437. Five judges dis-
sented, however, and four of them specifically rejected application of the business
purpose rule. Id. at 440-42 (Chabot, J., dissenting); id. at 443 (Nins, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, a six-judge concurring opinion maintained that application of the busi-
ness purpose rule would conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 439 (Tanne-
wald, J., concurring). The concurring opinion held that facts, not motive, were deter.
minative and applied a substance over form rule. Id. at 439-40 (Tannewald, J., con-
curring); see notes 45-4-7 supra and accompanying text. Thus, 11 of the court's 16
judges rejected application of the business purpose doctrine to a corporate distribu-
tion.
80. Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d at 743, 746, 749 (citing Commissioner
v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir.
1963); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950)). To the extent that it has any meaning
outside the reorganization area, Gregory is a substance over form case. See notes
44-46 supra. Court Holding is clearly a substance over form case. United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 454 n.3. Steel Improvement is a step
transaction case. See Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 749 n.7 (Ct. Cl.
1977); cf. Rev. Rul. 75-193, 1975-2 C.B. 109 (tax treatment on substance over form
question). Transport Trading has been strongly criticized. See note 67 supra.
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the conclusion that a business purpose is required under section
316(a).8' Although Congress did not discuss a motive test under sec-
tion 316, it did consider and enact motive tests in the pertinent Code
subchapter on corporate distributions and adjustments, Subchapter
C.8" Congress specifically considered the impact of substance over
form and business purpose cases prior to enacting the subchapter.8
Congress enacted motive tests when deemed necessary. More often,
Congress enacted objective tests to determine tax consequences.,, In
fact, the purpose of numerous changes made to the subchapter in
1954 was to eliminate the uncertainty of poorly defined judicial
doctrines." Thus, this application of a business purpose test to dis-
tributions is not justified by reference to congressional intent and cre-
ates the kind of uncertainty Congress preferred to eliminate.
B. Interest Deductions
The business purpose doctrine also has been applied by lower
courts to interest deductions.6 The Supreme Court requires that a
transaction creating an interest deduction possess economic
substance.Y7 The question, therefore, is whether economic substance
mandates a business purpose. Economic substance has been defined
by some courts as the possibility of profit or the risk of loss to the
borrower."' This interpretation is reasonable because an economic
81. See Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 749 (Ct. CI. 1977). In its
discussion of the case the court mentions the section only once, in the conclusion.
Id.
82. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(ii) (tax avoidance test applied to redemption);
id. § 306(b)(4) ("transactions not in avoidance"). But see Supreme Inv. Corp. v.
United States, 468 F.2d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 1972) (interpreted I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) test
of stepped up basis for assets received as objective and applied despite a taxpayer's
tax avoidance motive).
83. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 48-49, reprinted in (1954] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 4679-80.
84. See, e.g., id. at 44, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
4675. Objective rules of attribution were promulgated to prevent tax avoidance. A
special rule for dividend in kind was promulgated to prevent tax avoidance. Id. at 46,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4677.
85. Id. at 41-42, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4672. But
see I.R.C. § 306(b)(4) (tax avoidance test applies); note 82 supra and accompanying
text.
86. Lifschultz v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 1968); Goldstein v.
Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967);
Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1969). But see Bridges v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963) (interpreting Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960)) (applying beneficial interest test); Interest Deduction, supra
note 12, at 1232-33, 1238 (discussing Bridges).
87. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); see Coors v. United States,
572 F.2d 826, 832 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (describes Knetsch as a "sham- case). See generally
notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
88. Bridges v. Commissioner, 3295 F.2d 180, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1963); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 615, 619-202N \.D.N.C. 1980), see
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transaction involves more than the maintenance of the status quo.
When the Court formulated the economic substance test for
interest,' it expressly "put aside" a finding by the lower court that
the transaction was motivated by tax avoidance.2 The Court de-
scribed the case as a "sham"9' and called the underlying transaction a
"fiction." w
The Second Circuit, however, requires purposive activity or an ex-
pectation of profit.Y In Goldstein v. Commissioner,' a taxpayer with
an extraordinary increase in income for one year took out a large
loan. The loan was structured to provide a pre-tax loss and a tax
benefit greater than that loss." The Second Circuit, conceding that
the transaction was not a sham,6 focused exclusively on the taxpayer's
purpose and adopted a variation of the business purpose test for in-
terest deductions." This analysis is incorrect.
The legislative history on this point was scant.' The Second Cir-
cuit conceded that Code section 163 did not require interest to be a
business expense, ordinary and necessary, or even reasonable.
Nonetheless, the court found an underlying and unsupported notion
of congressional intent to encourage purposive activity."W
Recent legislative history in this area is more enlightening and sup-
ports rejection of the business purpose doctrine.'' In 1969, Con-
gress, amending the Code to prevent tax avoidance devices,1°  limited
Interest Deduction, supra note 12, at 1232-33. Of course, normal commercial use of
borrowed funds will imbue the transaction with substance. See id. at 1241.
89. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).
90. Id. at 365.
91. Id. at 366.
92. Id. at 365-66.
93. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 7,1-44 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); see Lifschultz v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 232, 234 (2d
Cir. 1968); Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404, 415-16 (Ct. Cl. 1969). The
court in Goldstein implied that purposive activity is anything other than tax avoid-
ance. 364 F.2d at 741.
94. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
95. Id. at 736-38.
96. Id. at 742.
97. Id. at 741-42.
98. The court recognized the importance of examining Congressional intent, id.
at 741, and admitted that the provision, I.R.C. § 163(a), was extremely broad and
that any intent was difficult to ascertain. 364 F.2d at 741. It then proceeded to
articulate with specificity the intent underlying the provision. Id.
99. Id.; 4A J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 26.01 (1979 rev. ed.).
100. 364 F.2d at 741-42.
101. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 615, 621-22
(M.D.N.C. 1980).
102. S. Rep. No. 552, 91st. Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 13-14 , reprinted in (1969] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2027, 2027, 2039-40; H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2, 8-10, 71-73, reprinted in [1969] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1645,
1645-46, 1653-54, 1718-19.
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the deduction for investment interest to $25,000 with adjustments,
in a single year."°  In 1976, Congress further considered abuse in
this area" 0 and again demonstrated its preference for objective tests.
It further lowered the deduction for investment interest I and estab-
lished objective rules for permitting deductions for prepaid
interest."9  A motive test was neither considered nor proposed.1r
C. Prepaid Feed
Prepaid feed costs are deductible under Code section 162(a)" as
"ordinary and necessary [business] expenses" 1 9 of farming. Courts re-
quire that the purchase serve a business purpose before allowing the
deduction."' Some courts, however, have accepted the argument
that the prepayment must also serve a business purpose."' More-
103. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 221, 83 Stat. 574 (codified at
I.R.C. § 163(d)).
104. S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3439, 3440, 3445-46; H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
8-9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2897, 2898-99, 2903-04.
105. The limitation on investment interest was lowered from $25,000 to $10,000.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, § 209, 90 Stat. 1542-43 (codified at
I.R.C. § 163(d)(1)(A)).
106. Id. § 208, 90 Stat. 1541-42 (codified at I.R.C. § 461(g)).
107. A proposed limitation on personal interest was rejected by the House in con-
ference. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 417-18, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4118, 4128-29. Even without these additional provi-
sions, the Commissioner had the statutory power to prevent the abusive use of the
interest deduction in Goldstein and similar cases. I.R.C. § 446(b) provides that if the
method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, the Commissioner may recom-
pute taxable income. See Sandor v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469, 481 (1974), affd per
curiam, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976).
108. I.R.C. § 162(a). Farmers have been accorded the right to deduct currently
the cost of purchasing feed for livestock for over 60 years. United States v. Catto,
384 U.S. 102, 110 n.13 (1966). Although this is a factor a court may consider in
determining the validity of a current deduction for the cost of feed, Van Radan v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1108 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7486 (9th Cir.
Sept. 18, 1979), it does not directly affect the central question of this Note, that is,
whether any justification for adopting a business purpose test exists.
109. Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 426 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 907 (1979) (quotations omitted); see I.R.C. § 162(a), 446$b).
110. Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 426-27 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 907 (1979).
111. Stice v. United States, 540 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1976); Clement v.
United States, 580 F.2d 422, 432 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979);
see Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144, superseded and expanded, Rev. Rul. 79-229,
1979-2 C.B. 210. The entire business purpose analysis of Rev. Rul. 75-152 was in-
corporated into Rev. Rul. 79-229. Unless otherwise indicated, the Revenue Ruling
discussed will be 79-229. In addition to requiring a business purpose, the Rulings
require the payment to be more than a mere deposit and not materially to distort
income. The deposit test relies on the theory that "expenses paid or incurred" in
I.R.C. § 162(a) do not include refundable deposits. Shippy v. United States, 199 F.
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over, the Commissioner has attempted, unsuccessfully to date, to de-
fine business purpose narrowly to exclude prepayment that protects
against price increases when alternate protection exists."' This argu-
ment proposes a more costly alternative rule " that requires a tax-
payer to select the business transaction that maximizes taxes.
The Commissioner has cited some weak judicial precedent,"4 but
no direct statutory support, for requiring a business purpose for the
timing of a prepaid feed deduction. The relevant Code sections,
162(a) and 446(b), require only that the expense be ordinary and
necessary, and that the method of accounting clearly reflect income."5
Supp. 842, 844 (D.S.D. 1961), affd, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962); Lillie v. Commis-
sioner, 45 T.C. 54, 63 (1965), affd per curiam, 370 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1966). The
material distortion test is expressed in I.R.C. § 446(b). Clement v. United States,
580 F.2d 422, 430-31 (Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
112. Private Letter Ruling No. 8015046 (Dec. 31, 1979). The ruling rejected two
Tax Court cases that had accepted the desire to fix the future cost of feed as a
business purpose, Van Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1096-1101, appeal
docketed, No. 79-7486 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 1979); Haynes v. Commissioner, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) 950, 952 (1979), and argued that the taxpayers' business purposes
could have been as well served by the practice of hedging or forward contracting.
The letter ruling defined hedging as purchasing futures contracts that rise in value as
the cash price of feed rises, thus offsetting any increase in price. The ruling de-
scribed forward contracting as the purchase of an actual contract for future delivery
of grain.
113. Bittker, supra note 3, at 711-13; see Rice, supra note 2, at 1040; cf. Commis-
sioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., dissenting) ( "[N]obody
owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands."), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
859 (1947).
114. Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144 (1975) (citing Shippy v. United States, 308
F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962); Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959);
Lillie v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 54 (1965), affd per curiam, 370 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1966); Ernst v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 181 (1959)). Cravens and Ernst were decided
for the taxpayer. 272 F.2d at 901; 32 T.C. at 186-87. Additionally, the Commissioner
has repudiated Cravens in Private Letter Ruling No. 8015046 (Dec. 31, 1979), and
the Tax Court has cited it as a case refuting the business purpose doctrine. Schenk v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 455, 458 n.3 (1980). Lillie, relying on Shippy, ex-
pressly adopted the deposit theory. 45 T.C. at 63. Similarly, the prepayment in
Shippy was a "deposit." 308 F.2d at 746. Subsequent cases approving the Revenue
Rulings also have been decided on theories other than the business purpose doc-
trine. Stice v. United States, 540 F.2d 1077, 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1976) (deposit
theory); Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422, 430-31 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (distortion of
income theory), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
115. I.R.C. § 162(a), permitting the deduction of "ordinary and necessary
[business] expenses," says nothing about the timing of payments. See Ward, Tax
Postponement and the Cash Method Farmer: An Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-152,
53 Tex. L. Rev. 1119, 1169-72 (1975). I.R.C. § 446(b) has been applied to transac-
tions such as income, American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 688 n.1
(1961) (applying I.R.C. § 41 (1939), predecessor to I.R.C. § 446), which is taxable
regardless of purpose, see I.R.C. § 61, and to interest deductions. Sandor v. Com-
missioner, 62 T.C. 469, 476-79, affd per curiam, 536 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1976).
No business purpose is required for the interest deduction. Van Raden v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1102-03 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7486 (9th Cir. Sept.
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A business purpose test, in effect, requires a business purpose for the
method of accounting.16
No congressional intent to create this effect can be found."'
Although prepayment can be abused, Congress has recently discussed
and provided objective standards to determine what constitutes
abuse."' Section 464(a) limits the deduction for prepaid feed and
other farm expenses incurred by a "farming syndicate," a carefully
defined type of tax shelter."' The legislative history of this objective
test is replete with discussion of what Congress considered abuse, but
does not support a tax avoidance motive test.'12 Moreover, the
amendment of section 464(a) was directed at syndicates formed for
the sole purpose of exploiting tax deductions intended for farmers.''
Implicitly, the use of such deductions by most farmers was not
deemed abusive.
Statutory support for requiring a business purpose for prepayment
of feed is ambiguous at best, and the legislative history reveals no
such congressional intent. Tax legislation controlling the timing of de-
ductions is comprehensive '2 - and includes sections directed at
18, 1979). Although an appropriate basis for the distortion of income test, Dunn v.
United States, 468 F. Supp. 991, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), I.R.C. § 446(b) does not
support a business purpose test. See Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 680-81
(8th Cir. 1973); note 111 supra.
116. The Commissioner accepts the validity of the deduction, but argues that it
should be deferred. Rev. Rul. 79-229, 1979-2 C.B. 210. The result would be a
change from a cash to an inventory method of accounting. Van Raden v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1108 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7486 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
1979)..
117. See Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 1973). Mann re-
jected the business purpose doctrine prior to publication of the Revenue Rulings.
The appropriateness of a business purpose test has been termed "arguable," Van
Raden v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1112 (1979) (Tannenwald, J., concurring),
appeal docketed, No. 79-7486 (9th Cir. Sept. 18. 1979), and the Tax Court has de-
clined to recognize it. Schenk v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 455, 458 (1930).
The Tax Court also has been reluctant to challenge a taxpayer's allegation of a busi-
ness purpose. Frysinger v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1287, 1292 (1980);
Heinold v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 689 (1979); Van Baden v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 1083, 1096-101 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7486 (9th Cir. Sept.
18, 1979). See generally Ward, supra note 115, at 1173-77.
118. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 207, 90 Stat. 1536-38 (1976) (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 464); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-62, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3439, 3487-98. The Senate was specifically
concerned about "[h]igh-bracket taxpayers [who] use farm tax rules to shelter non-
farm income." Id. at 54, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3490.
119. A farm syndicate is a partnership or other farming enterprise in which an
interest has been publicly offered, I.R.C. § 464(c)(1)(A), or in which more than 35%
of the losses are allocable to limited partners or limited entrepreneurs. I.R.C.
§ 464(c)(1)(B).
120. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. I.R.C. §§ 446-466.
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farmers. 12 The business purpose doctrine, as applied to farmers, in-
trudes into this congressional tax scheme.
D. Gift and Leaseback
Rental payments and other payments for the use of property are
deductible as business expenses under Code section 162(a)(3). ' 4 The
Commissioner has argued, and some courts have agreed, that gifts of
property in which the grantee leases the property back to the grantor
require a non-tax avoidance purpose for the lease payments to be
deductible.'- These cases usually involve intra-family gifts in the
form of a Clifford trust. 2 6
Direct statutory support for this business purpose test is ambig-
uous. Code section 162(a)(3) is cited by some courts to support the
doctrine and by others to reject it." Some courts have suggested a
variation of the substance over form doctrine,123 permitting the deduc-
tion when the gift has economic substance because it actually trans-
fers control.'
Only one court has applied a recognized rule of statutory inter-
pretation to the problem, applying objective tests derived from Code
sections 671-678 to determine if the gift and leaseback should be rec-
123. Id. §§ 447, 464.
124. Id. § 162(a)(3).
125. Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972);
Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965). But see May v. Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) No. 2 (1981) (rejects
business purpose requirement of the 5th Circuit in Mathews).
126. Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d '140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 814 (1965).The income in a Clifford trust is paid to, or on behalf of, a
beneficiary; the corpus reverts to the grantor or some other grantee. See Quinlivan
v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 270-71 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
The business purpose test has also been applied to outright gifts. See Brooke v.
United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972).
127. See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272-73 (8th Cir.) (rejects doc-
trine), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323,
325 (5th Cir. 1975) (supports doctrine), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Perry v.
United States, 520 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052
(1976). See generally Serbousek v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 479, 481 (1977)
(noting the split in the Circuits).
128. See Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948); May v.
Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) No. 2, at 2614 (1981); Serbousek v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 479, 482 n.8 (1977).
129. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 333-37 (1940); Corliss v.
Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 377-78 (1930). These cases deal with the question whether the
grantor or beneficiary of a reversionary trust is taxable on the income of the trust.
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ognized for tax purposes.'t This court rejected the business purpose
test.'3
The requirement of a business purpose in gift and leaseback cases
is derived principally from a sale and leaseback case.131 That case
relied on Supreme Court precedent 3 that applied the business pur-
pose test to the specific statutory language of section 112(g) of the
Revenue Act of 1928,'4 a section neither directly related nor analo-
gous to Code section 162(a)(3),' 3- and other substance over form
cases 1 36 that applied a doctrine distinct from the business purpose
rule-" In addition, the Court's most recent sale and leaseback case
emphasizes objective criteria in determining whether leaseback pay-
ments are deductible.138
130. Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 996 (1979); see Note, Clifford Trusts: A New View Towards Leaseback Deduc-
tions, 43 Alb. L. Rev. 585, 594 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Clifford Trusts]. Applying
tests derived from related statutes is a suggested rule of statutory construction. See
Sutherland, supra note 62, § 28.10. The analysis used in Quinlivan is similar to that
applied under I.R.C. 88 671-678, which delineate rules to determine whether in-
come from a reversionary trust is taxable to grantor or grantee. 599 F.2d at 273;
Clifford Trusts, supra, at 594. These sections supercede the judicial tests created in
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), Clifford Trusts, supra, at 585 n.1, and
create objective tests. For example, generally the trust must continue more than ten
years, I.R.C. § 673(a), certain powers to affect the trust must reside in an adverse or
nonsubservient party, Id. §§ 674, 675, and the grantor or nonadverse party may not
have the power to revoke. Id. § 676.
131. Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
132. W.H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1951); see
Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 324 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976).
133. W.H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1951)
(citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus &
Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).
134. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 818 (current version at
I.R.C. § 368).
135. Section 112(g) dealt with reorganizations. Id. Reorganizations are not analo-
gous to the ordinary and necessary business expenses of I.R.C. § 162(a). See
Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 696 (1941).
136. W.H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1951)
(citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus &
Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939)).
137. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
138. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 581-84 (1978); accord, La
Mair v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, 1339-41 (1977). Unlike a gift and
leaseback transaction, a sale and leaseback often raises a factual question, whether the
sale is actually a method of financing. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561, 581-84 (1978); Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209, 1225-29 (1979),
appeal docketed, No. 80-1149 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1980). Motive considerations in a
sale and leaseback overlap with the courts' consideration of economic reality.
Schaefer v. Commissioner, 41 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 100, 104 n.13 (1980); Car-
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Although Congress has never indicated whether a business purpose
is required for the gift in the gift and leaseback context, 39 Congress
has considered an analogous problem: whether intra-family gifts of
reversionary trusts were taxable to the grantor or grantee.4 0 The
Court had applied substance over form rules, and the Commissioner
had provided objective tests of whether these rules were satisfied. "'
Desiring codification,14 Congress enacted Code sections 671-678,
adopting some of the Commissioner's rules and modifying others."'
The rules established are objective.'" Therefore, congressional action
in this analogous area seems to indicate that motive is not determina-
tive.
E. Miscellaneous Contexts
In an apparent attempt to establish the business purpose doctrine
as a pervasive judicial doctrine, the Commissioner recently has pro-
posed its use in additional isolated fact patterns.45 Disregarding
more appropriate doctrines or statutory remedies, the Commissioner
has applied the doctrine to void tax benefits resulting from the for-
giveness of debt of a closely held corporation by a controlling
shareholder,' the incorporation of a business by a controlling share-
holder and his assignment to that corporation of various contracts, "7
roll v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 736, 741-42 (1978). The Tax Court has
distinguished economic reality from the business purpose test. Serbousek v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 479, 482 (1977).
139. See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
140. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-37 (1940).
141. Treas. Reg. §§ 118-39.22(a)-21 to -22 (1952) (commonly known as Clifford
Regulations), superseded by I.R.C. §§ 671-678; 1954 Senate Report, supra note 42, at
86, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4719.
142. See note 141 supra.
143. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 86-87, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 4719; see note 130 supra.
144. See note 130 supra; 6 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 37.41,
at 91 (1975 rev. ed).
145. See notes 67-73 s-upra.
146. Dwyer v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 99, 102-03 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd, 622
F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1980). As a cash basis taxpayer, the shareholder had never re-
ported the accrued interest as income. By forgiving the debt, he increased the
amount available upon liquidation and increased his capital gain under I.R.C. § 331.
He had no ordinary income because he never received an interest payment. 439 F.
Supp. at 102-03.
147. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309, 1313 (1976), rev'd, 621
F.2d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1980). The court was influenced by the existence of alternate
means of dealing with the alleged tax avoidance. 621 F.2d at 873; see Rubin v.
Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1970). For exanple, I.R.C. § 482 permits
the Commissioner to reallocate income between related parties if necessary to avoid
the evasion of tax, or to reflect income clearly. 621 F,2d at 873.
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and an intra-family installment sale. 46 Although the specific facts in
these cases justified the Commissioner's challenge of their tax con-
sequences, and the cases were decided for the Commissioner'41 or
remanded for further findings, I the Commissioner's business purpose
doctrine did not fare well. In two of these cases, the courts rejected
its use.' The third case, in which the Tax Court apparently adopted
a business purpose test,5 2 has been distinguished by that court as
applying a substance over form test.-
The cases discussed represent diverse fact patterns, but have in
common the lack of a statutory basis for consideration of motive.
They demonstrate the use of the doctrine as a substitute for analysis
of facts and application of a more appropriate judicial doctrine or
Code section.'-'
CONCLUSION
The use of the business purpose doctrine as a pervasive judicial
doctrine lacks support and results in splits in circuits, S splits be-
tween courts, 5 ' and inconsistent applications within the same
148. Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 576 (1976). Tax may be deferred on such a
sale under I.R.C. § 453. Cf. Lustgarten v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 303. 309-10 (1978)
(installment sale to son, control test applied). Intrafamily sales are now governed by
I.R.C. §§ 453(e), (g). These new provisions, which adopt a business purpose test, are
intended to create no inference for those cases not controlled by them. See S. Rep.
No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1980] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 8340, 8356.
149. Dwyer v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 99 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd, 622 F.2d 460
(1980), was decided in favor of the taxpayer in the district court. Id. at 102. The
Commissioner's alternative argument based on the assignment of income theory was
also rejected. Id. at 102. This theory was accepted by the Ninth Circuit, however,
which found that the taxpayer had sufficient control over the income for this doctrine
to apply. 622 F.2d at 462-63; see note 129 supra and accompanying text; Cf.
Braddock Land Co. v. Commissioner, 75 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) No. 26 (1980) (sub-
stance over form analysis applied to similar facts). Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
576 (1976), was also decided for the Commissioner.
150. See note 147 supra.
151. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1980); Dwyer v.
United States, 439 F. Supp. 99, 102 (D. Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1980).
152. Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 576, 584 (1976).
153. See Goodman v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 684, 709 (1980); Weaver v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 443, 454 (1978) (distinguishing Wrenn as a case in which the install-
ment sale did not transfer control), appeal docketed, No. 79-1587 (6th Cir. June 22,
1979). See generally Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 311 (1978), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7277 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 1979); Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 225 (1978);
Rushing v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 888 (1969), affd, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971). In
these cases, which concerned installment sales to intra-family trusts, the Tax Court
applied a control test. See notes 129, 148 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 147, 149, 153 supra.
155. See notes 86, 127 supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 78, 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
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court. " ' The doctrine should be applied when Congress requires it,
not when a court determines that a "deal is too good to be true."""
For tax loopholes that remain unplugged, the appropriate remedy is
"application of the Congressional thumb, not the court's."119
Harry Waizer
157. See Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 273 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
158. Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 745 (Ct. CI. 1977) (quotations omit-
ted).
159. Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 879 (1st Cir.
1961) (footnote omitted).
